| The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance David Reynolds (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 1982), 397 pages For David Reynolds, the Anglo-American alliance remains “one of the closest diplomatic relationships in modern history.” This book tells the tale of the formative years for the alliance between 1937 and 1941. A well structured and informative work, it engages the reader in two themes: the gradual creation of the alliance between these two sovereign states and the rivalry within this partnership for advantage and leadership. The second theme represents a more unfamiliar tale and, therefore, represents a major contribution to knowledge in the field. Reynolds makes it abundantly clear from the start that the Anglo-American alliance did more than just defeat fascism in the Second World War; it also led to a shift in global power from Britain to the United States. Although a well-worn argument, the beauty of the book lies in the detailed explanations behind Britain fighting to retain its role as a world power during the early stages of this necessary alliance. Moreover, Britain wanted to ensure that its empire stayed intact. Roosevelt, however, only increased U.S. engagement in the alliance when Churchill proved desperate and allowed the president to implement the will of his country in exchange for tacit military support. Despite the fact that the partnership evened out following the U.S. entry into the war, the disdain of American elites for the hierarchical class society operating the British Empire proved ominous for the survival of this grand experiment in control. In other words, the Anglo-American alliance, which helped save the world from the unbridled tyranny of fascism, relegated Britain to middle-power status following the war by, in part, stripping the U.K. of its colonial possessions. The beauty of Reynolds’ work lies in his treatment of the conflicts experienced by both sides in creating this alliance. Despite the rhetoric of Churchill that the U.K. and the U.S. shared a special cultural bond, portraying the alliance as a natural phenomenon, a substantial amount of competition and compromise occurred. Britain felt the strains of compromise more fully as it faced the Nazi juggernaut alone during the last half of 1940 and the early stages of 1941. This dire situation made Britain dependent upon U.S. assistance in the form of armaments to keep it in the war. Reynolds succeeds in portraying this coalition as a watershed moment in the shift of global power, while never forgetting that these heady days retain responsibility for the creation of the strongest alliance historically experienced by either side. Reynolds’ work should be required reading for anyone interested in this unique relationship. |
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